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Abstract Our current views of economic competition are still rooted in the imagery
of the isolated firm that transacts with its buyers, suppliers, and competitors via
largely anonymous factor and product markets. Yet this view is fundamentally at odds
with the growing importance of business groups in the global economy. We thus need
a reconceptualized version of our idea of economic competition, which is capable of
explaining competitive advantage at the group-versus-group rather than firm-versus-
firm level of analysis. In the present paper we build on insights derived from orga-
nizational sociology and organizational economics to develop a business group-level
theory of competition and competitive advantage based on embedded competencies.
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1 The discrete organizational perspective
The idea that business organizations are bundles of idiosyncratic resources and
resource conversion activities is central to the resource-based view (RBV) of the
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firm (Rumelt 1984). The perspective accounts for inter-firm performance differen-
tials by examining how economic rents derive from resources and capabilities that
are valuable, inimitable, and non-substitutable (Barney 1991; Dierickx and Cool
1989; Lippman and Rumelt 1982). The perspective is isolationist, because the RBV
suggests that the process of economic value creation is dependent on a firm’s ability
to seal off its most valuable assets from competitors’ attempts at imitating or
purchasing those resources. In this paper we refer to this position in RBV theorizing
as the discrete organizational perspective.
The view of economic competition that underlies the discrete organizational
perspective centers on head-to-head clashes between materially independent firms.
This view is fundamentally at odds with the increasing importance of business
groups—‘‘sets of legally separate firms bound together in persistent formal and/or
informal ways’’ (Granovetter 2005, p. 429)—in the contemporary economy. Three
examples suffice to make this point. First, in China, the business group is currently
experiencing a meteoric rise. In restructuring the Chinese economy, Chinese
reformers have closely studied business groups in other Asian countries, and have
begun building Chinese versions of these conglomerates from the mid-1980s onwards
(Keister 1998). In particular, Korean chaebols have inspired Chinese reformers to
promote kin-based linkages across separate ventures (cf. Chang 2003), whereas
Japanese keiretsu have set the example for linkages based on cross-venture lending,
trade, shareholding, and director dispatch (cf. Lincoln and Gerlach 2004). Second, in
many of the former communist countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, managers
are currently breaking up large formerly state-owned firms into numerous interde-
pendent joint stock and limited liability companies. They do this to deal with bad debts,
the threats of bankruptcy, and declining sales (Kornai 1992; Stark 1996). Third, even in
the mature economies of North America and Western Europe, business group-like
corporate structures are on the increase, due to the persistent growth in number and
magnitude of strategic alliances and other forms of cross-corporate collaboration
(Gulati 1999; Gulati et al. 2000; Kogut 1988). These three trends combined clearly
reduce the empirical domain of the discrete RBV. How can the theory be adapted to
explain the type of economic competition we find in business group-dominated
contexts, and the competitive advantage of the business groups themselves?
We suggest that the discrete RBV requires a revision in order to increase its fit
with an increasingly business group-intensive economy (cf. Lavie 2006). Specif-
ically, an extension of the perspective is needed that: (a) accounts for the boundary-
spanning properties of competencies within business groups, and (b) explains how
such competencies can contribute to the performance of business groups in their
entirety. We offer such an extension in the current paper, after we present a concise
overview of the scope conditions pertaining to our analysis. Like all scientific work,
the conceptual analysis presented here builds on a number of prior contributions that
explore how interfirm ties contribute to the development and exploitation of
competitive resources (cf. Almeida and Kogut 1999; Dyer and Singh 1998;
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; Foss and Eriksen 1995; Gulati 1999; Gulati
et al. 2000; Lavie 2006; McEvily and Marcus 2005; Shan et al. 1994; Sorensen and
Reve 1998; Uzzi 1997; Zajac and Olsen 1993). What all of these contributions have
in common, however, is that they are reluctant to do away with the discrete
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perspective altogether. Their focus remains on the competitiveness implications of
network ties for individual firms. In contrast, we lift the level of the analysis of
competitive advantage from firm-versus-firm to group-versus-group.
2 Scope conditions: business group prevalence and profitability
The value of our analysis is potentially bounded by two scope conditions. A first
scope condition is business group prevalence. The alternative to the discrete
organizational perspective we develop here is essentially a resource-based theory of
sustainable competitive advantage at the business group level. Hence, if business
groups were a sporadically occurring phenomenon, the value of our analysis would
be limited on the whole. Relatedly, if business group prevalence would largely be
restricted to certain geographic regions, then our analysis would only be applicable
to those regions. A second scope condition is business group profitability. An
underlying premise of our analysis is that the business group is an inherently
attractive organizational form, which is in no way ‘hardwired’ to underperform
stand-alone firms. If business group performance would systemically lag behind that
of unaffiliated firms, any project aiming to explain group-level competitive
advantages would necessarily be limited in its relevance.
To explore our first scope condition (prevalence), we compiled an overview
which synthesizes the prevalence of the business group organizational form in
relation to the proportion of stand-alone firms for 38 different countries around the
globe (see Table 1). The second column of this table shows the proportion of firms
in a given nation that are affiliated with a business group. On average, no less than
43.9% of all firms in a given country are not stand-alone firms, but durably affiliated
with a business group. Moreover, due to a lack of full data for certain economies
(such as the US), these estimates are also rather conservative. In other words,
business groups are not a sporadically occurring phenomenon, but rather a
prominent feature of the global competitive landscape. These data thus provide
support for our project of developing a ‘friendly amended’ version of the RBV that
is able to explain the performance of business groups.
According to received insights in the business group literature, however, this
organizational form may not be as prevalent in mature markets as it is in developing
nations. More in particular, the influential ‘institutional voids’ thesis holds that
business groups are more prevalent in emerging markets like Brazil, India, or China,
because of their capacity to fill the deficiencies in the matrix of business-relevant
background institutions that were created by a rapidly but often unevenly
developing nation-state (Khanna and Palepu 2004; Whitley 1999). Institutional
voids theoreticians point out that business groups have the capacity to internalize
failing institutions, such as the markets for venture capital and managerial talent, by
redistributing resources over the individual firms comprising the group according to
their needs and prospects. Consequentially, business groups are likely to be more
prominent in nations with deficient background institutions. To test whether the
presence of institutional voids is a relevant scope condition for our project, we
correlate business group prevalence with a widely used indicator for institutional
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Table 1 The prevalence and profitability of business groups
Country Prevalence
groups (%)
Absolute
profitability
(%)
Relative
profitability
Rule
of law
Argentina 51d 4.9d - (**)d, h -0.58g
Australia 30a – – 1.81g
Austria 28c – – 1.87g
Belgium 65c – – 1.45g
Brazil 48d 5.0d n.s.d -0.48g
Canada 15a – – 1.85g
Chile 36d 8.0d - (*)d 1.15g
Denmark 68c – n.s.f 2.03g
Finland 69c – – 1.95g
France 58c – + (**)f 1.31g
Germany 32c – n.s.f 1.77g
Greece 25c – – 0.64g
Hong Kong 25b – n.s.e 1.45g
India 49d 10.8d + (**)d 0.17g
Indonesia 67b 9.3d + (**)d -0.82g
Ireland 37c – – 1.62g
Israel 33d 9.0d + (*)d 0.69g
Italy 55c – n.s.f 0.37g
Japan 36b – n.s.e 1.40g
Malaysia 39b – – 0.58g
Mexico 32d 8.1d n.s.d -0.49g
Netherlands 67c – n.s.f 1.75g
New Zealand 25a – – 1.93g
Norway 41c – n.s.f 2.02g
Peru 26d 3.1d + (*)d -.75g
Philippines 40b 6.7d - (*)d -.48g
Portugal 20a – – 0.97g
Singapore 55b – + (*)e 1.82g
South Africa 49d 13.2d + (*)d 0.24g
South Korea 43b 6.0d n.s.d 0.72g
Spain 46c – n.s.f 1.10g
Sweden 74c – n.s.f 1.86g
Switzerland 60c – n.s.f 1.96g
Taiwan 49b 5.3d + (**)d 0.77g
Thailand 61d 6.1d n.s.d 0.03g
Turkey 45d 23.2d n.s.d 0.08g
UK 68c – n.s.f 1.73g
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development, notably: Kaufmann et al.’s (2006) rule of law variable (see Arndt and
Oman 2006, for a critical reading). Column 5 reports the rule of law scores for all
countries in our sample. As it turns out, business group prevalence is not
significantly correlated to overall institutional development (r = .02; n.s.), implying
that business groups do not merely exist to functionally compensate for institutional
deficiencies. In other words, the quality of the matrix of background institutions is
not a relevant scope condition for our project.
The second scope condition to potentially impinge upon the generalizability of
our analysis is the profitability of business group members. Three reasons are
commonly stipulated as to why affiliated firms would underperform stand-alone
firms (Khanna and Rivkin 2001; Heugens et al. 2008). First, affiliated firms may be
exposed to strong social pressures to ‘bail out’ other firms in the group that are
temporarily or structurally facing conditions of lowered competitiveness and
profitability. Second, business group members are often made to purchase supplies
from their group siblings, irrespective of the quality they deliver. Therefore they
often have to make do with inferior inputs. Third, group members’ profits may also
be siphoned off (‘tunneled’) by controlling shareholders for private consumption,
who thereby reduce the overall performance of affiliates. Undoubtedly, business
group members are occasionally confronted with such perverse effects. The
question is, however, whether these effects are pervasive enough to make the
business group an inferior organizational form. To explore this question, we made
an inventory of how firms affiliated with a business group perform relative to stand-
Table 1 continued
Country Prevalence
groups (%)
Absolute
profitability
(%)
Relative
profitability
Rule
of law
US 0a – – 1.57g
Sources:
a La Porta et al. (1999, p. 493). Reported is the percentage of the largest 20 widely held firms in which
the ultimate owner is another firm with at least a 10% stake. Data was compiled by summing columns
‘Widely held financial’ and ‘Widely held corporation.’ Estimate is often highly conservative, due to the
focus on equity ties and the exclusion of family-owned business groups
b Claessens et al. (2000, p. 92). Reported is the percentage of all firms in which the ultimate owner exercises
control through at least one widely-held firm. Family-owned business groups are included in this estimate
c Belenzon and Berkovitz (2008, p. 26). Reported is the percentage of all firms affiliated with a business
group, with annual sales above one million dollars and with more than 50 employees
d Khanna and Rivkin (2001, pp. 56–57). Reported is the percentage of all publicly listed firms affiliated
with a business group; the absolute performance of these firms as measured by their return on assets; and
the performance of these firms relative to stand-alone firms
e Heugens et al. (2008). Reported is meta-analytic evidence of the performance of group-affiliated firms
relative to stand-alone firms in Asia
f Van Essen et al. (2008). Reported is meta-analytic evidence of the performance of group-affiliated firms
relative to stand-alone firms in Europe
g Kaufmann et al. (2006). Reported is the rule of law score per country. See the original paper for more details
h ** Denotes a strongly significant effect, * Denotes a moderately significant effect. See the original
papers for more details
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alone firms (see Table 1). Column 3 presents the absolute profitability level
(measured as return on assets) for a select sub-set of countries. More importantly,
column 4 displays how group members perform relative to unaffiliated firms. The
results show that the suggested negative effects prevail in only three countries. In
eight countries, affiliated firms actually significantly outperform their unbounded
counterparts, for reasons we shall explore below. In 16 further countries no
significant performance differences exist between affiliated and unaffiliated firms. In
short, business groups are an attractive organizational form in their own right, and
their performance is not a relevant scope condition to our work.
3 Discrete and embedded definitions of competence
Our first ambition with this paper is to offer a reconceptualization of the discrete
competence perspective, such that it can account for the fact that the competencies
of the individual organizations comprising a business group are often highly
interwoven and deliberately shared amongst the group’s members (Chang 2003;
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; Granovetter 2005; Kogut 1988). To that end, we
first provide a definition of the discrete competencies concept, based on an overview
of the prior literature. Next, we introduce the economic-sociological notion of
embeddedness (Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1999) to demonstrate how competencies
themselves can be seen as phenomena that are embedded in groups of collaborating
organizations. This will result in a definition of embedded competencies.
3.1 Defining discrete competencies
Three definitional characteristics of discrete competencies are commonly identified
in the literature, notably: competencies’ potential to coordinate lower-level
resources and capabilities; their ability to span business and product boundaries;
and their orientation towards collective goal attainment.
3.1.1 Coordinating resources and capabilities
Barnard (1968/1938) observes that a coordination function must underlie joint
action by organizational members. Others have extended this observation to include
coordination across resources and capabilities. Contemporary strategic management
scholars frequently build their definitions of competence around the coordination
theme. According to Roos and Von Krogh (1992), researchers should interpret
competencies as the coordinated synthesis of a firm’s particular task and knowledge
systems. Furthermore, through proficient coordination, business firms can enjoy
competitive advantages even if their underlying resources are identical to those of
their peers (Branzei and Thornhill 2006). As Sanchez et al. (1996) point out,
important differences between firms can arise from differences in coordinating the
deployments of resources. Competencies in this sense represent a form of
‘organizational capital’ (Eriksen and Mikkelsen 1996), which assists a firm to
integrate even generic resources into idiosyncratic value propositions.
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3.1.2 Spanning business and product boundaries
Various authors stress that valuable competencies span multiple businesses and
products (Coyne et al. 1997; Foss 1996; Hamel 1994; Hitt and Ireland 1985;
Prahalad and Hamel 1990; Rumelt 1994). Competencies can simultaneously be
applied to more than one market or business unit, so that they can be leveraged over
multiple revenue-generating activities (Itami 1987; Rumelt 1994). For example,
‘‘Canon’s core competencies in optics, imaging, and microprocessor controls have
enabled it to enter, even dominate, markets as seemingly diverse as copiers, laser
printers, cameras, and image scanners’’ (Prahalad and Hamel 1990, p. 83).
According to Sanchez et al. (1996, p. 8), a firm can apply its ‘‘existing competencies
to current or new market opportunities in ways that do not require qualitative
changes in the firm’s assets or capabilities’’ (Sanchez et al. 1996, p. 8). The
advantages flowing from this kind of competence leveraging are twofold. First, due
to their generic and flexible nature, competencies can be deployed in several ways
without costly adaptations (Hamel 1994). Second, if competencies already exist
elsewhere in the organization, far less time may be required to replicate them
internally than to compile them from scratch from generic resources purchased in
the market (Markides and Williamson 1994; Winter and Szulanski 2001).
3.1.3 Goal attainment
The competitive-teleological orientation of the competence perspective is perhaps
its most widely accepted characteristic (Andrews 1971; Coyne et al. 1997; Hitt and
Ireland 1985; Markides and Williamson 1994; McGrath et al. 1995; Snow and
Hrebiniak 1980). The literature often describes competencies as vehicles for
attaining strategic goals (McGrath et al. 1995). We define such goals as gaps
between the perceived and the desired state of any of the firm’s systemic elements.
Such a gap may consist of a difference between mediocre and superb execution of
critical processes (Coyne et al. 1997), between average and excellent problem-
solving abilities (Foss 1996), or between modest and rapid strategic growth rates.
Either way, competencies play an important role in a teleological view on social
organization, as it is their purpose to achieve concrete corporate goals or to facilitate
the sustenance of a competitive advantage over rivals (Heugens et al. 2006).
Drawing on these three themes, we define discrete competencies as a set of goal-
oriented learnings, which typically span the boundaries of the firm’s multiple
products and business units, and which serve to coordinate the firm’s underlying
resources and capabilities.
3.2 Defining embedded competencies
The problem with the above definition of discrete competencies is that it does not
adequately capture the skills, resources, and routines employed in the growing
section of the contemporary economy that is organized along the lines of business
groups. In short, what is needed is an additional definition of embedded
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competencies, which can be used to typify the competencies of groups of nominally
independent firms that are nevertheless durably linked through various types of
social and economic ties (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996). The notion of
embeddedness in this case ‘‘refers to the fact that economic action and outcomes,
like all social action and outcomes, are affected by actors’ dyadic (pair-wise)
relations and by the structure of the overall network of relations’’ (Granovetter
1993, p. 33).
Characteristic for the notion of embeddedness as it is used in economic sociology
is that it frames commercial exchange relationships not as relatively anonymous
market ties, but rather as durable webs of social attachments. The durability of such
exchanges makes that the identity of the exchange partners becomes important to
the exchange, and that the relationship acquires a social character above and beyond
the technical characteristics of the exchange at hand (Granovetter 1985). As the
exchange loses its anonymity, partners start building relationships in which trust and
mutual reliance rise to the fore (Uzzi 1999). No relationship starts out as a strong tie,
but embeddedness works as a priming mechanism through which small initial offers
of trust and assistance strengthen into a resilient tie, provided that they are
reciprocated. At least three characteristics mark embedded ties: trust, fine-grained
information transfer, and a collaborative orientation.
3.2.1 Trust
Trust exists when ‘‘one enters a transaction believing that transaction partners will
behave properly for reasons that transcend pure self-interest’’ (Granovetter 1993, p.
40). The concept entails a belief that one’s side is not going to be taken advantage of
and that one’s partner will give priority to the relationship over narrow self interest
(Uzzi 1997). Granovetter (1993) identifies three reasons for the emergence of trust
in embedded relationships. First, individuals act in a trustworthy way because they
perceive it to be in their social or economic interest to do so. Second, trust arises in
exchange relationships when partners believe that it is morally right to trust one
another. Finally, trust results when actors start to view it as an essential part of their
relationships with transaction partners (Granovetter 1993; Uzzi 1999). Governance
by trust both facilitates the exchange of private information and increases the
efficiency of economic transactions in general. In Arrow’s words, trust ‘‘is an
important lubricant of a social system. It is extremely efficient: it saves a lot of
trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people’s word’’ (1974, p. 23).
3.2.2 Fine-grained information transfer
Information transfer in embedded relationships ‘‘is not only more detailed and tacit
[than in arm’s length relationships] but has a holistic rather than a divisible structure
that is difficult to communicate through market ties’’ (Uzzi 1997, p. 45). Only
embedded ties allow for the transfer of private information (Portes and
Sensenbrenner 1993). Private information entails insights as diverse as the locus
of where a given actor’s specific expertise resides, the nature of the capabilities
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involved in the marketing of a complex product, the major resource dependencies of
a given contracting partner, and so forth. Since this kind of information can only be
exchanged as the by-product of an ongoing voluntary transfer between durably
linked parties, fine-grained information transfer tends to be associated with
embedded ties (Kogut 1988; McEvily and Marcus 2005; Uzzi 1997, 1999).
3.2.3 Collaborative orientation
A final definitional characteristic of embedded relationships is that they supplant the
exchange-centered logic of the arm’s length relationship—which centers on direct
reciprocation—with a collaborative orientation on both ends of the dyad. When the
partners exchange small gestures and minor favors, a mutual system of expectations
and pro-social norms emerges over time (Macaulay 1963). Preserving this system
subsequently becomes more important to the partners than the completion of any
discrete transaction (Williamson 1985). The collaborative orientation that cements
embedded ties has two aspects. First, collaboration plays a role in relational
problem-solving, in that ‘‘embedded ties entail problem-solving mechanisms that
enable actors to coordinate functions and work out problems ‘on the fly.’ These
arrangements typically consist of routines of negotiation and mutual adjustment that
flexibly resolve problems’’ (Uzzi 1997, p. 47). Second, a strong collaborative
orientation stimulates localized search behavior (Cyert and March 1963). The
emergence of embedded ties makes it more likely that firms will search ‘‘deep’’
within their network of relationships to find a collaborative solution to any problem
that might appear on the horizon, rather than look outside the network (e.g., in the
market) for solutions (Gulati et al. 2000).
For any definition of competencies to have any currency in the context of
business groups, it must be reconcilable with the embedded nature of business
groups’ actions and exchange transactions. Thus, we need to incorporate the notion
of embeddedness into our extant definition of competencies. Doing so results in the
following adapted definition: embedded competencies are a set of highly transfer-
able goal-oriented learnings, which typically span the boundaries of several
formally independent organizations, business units, and products divisions without
being ‘‘owned’’ by any of these in particular, and which serve to coordinate
underlying resources and capabilities across organizational fault lines.
4 Embedded competencies and competitive advantage
Our second ambition with this paper is to put this notion of embedded competencies
to work in the context of business groups. Specifically, we aim to arrive at a
conceptualization of the resource-based sources of the competitive advantage of
business groups. Doing so requires us to elevate the level at which economic
competition is assessed from firm-versus-firm to group-versus-group (Gomes-
Casseres 1994). Embedded competencies thus do not benefit individual firms in
particular, but business groups in their entirety. In contrast to what the discrete RBV
would predict, the value of embedded resources is negatively rather than positively
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related to the extent that they are fully internalized, shielded off from outside
inspection, and protected against imitation. Yet, the shared nature of embedded
competencies draws our attention to one problem that plays out especially at the
interorganizational level of analysis, notably: a problem of collective action with
respect to making investments in embedded competencies and dividing up their
proceeds. To solve the collective action problem, business groups typically use two
instruments: restrictions to group membership and profit redistribution rules for
balancing out private and collective gains.
4.1 Elevating the level of analysis of the RBV
The reconceptualization of competencies from discrete to embedded entities does
not fundamentally alter the logic of the RBV. Theoreticians schooled in the firm-
versus-firm conception of economic competition (e.g., Amit and Schoemaker 1993;
Barney 1991; Rumelt 1984) typically suggest that firms must acquire or develop
resources that are valuable (i.e., leading to efficiency gains or other forms of
economic quasi-rent); rare (i.e., supply being low as compared to demand);
inimitable (i.e., not easily copied by competitors); and organized for success (i.e.,
purposefully integrated into the organization’s administrative architecture).
The group-versus-group conceptualization of economic competition (Gomes-
Casseres 1994) does not discard these four principles. Instead, due to the increasing
relevance of business groups to the contemporary economy, we suggest that these
principles are best applied at the group-versus-group than at the firm-versus-firm
level of analysis. Specifically, the present paper suggests that business groups in
their entirety, rather than organizations individually, must seek to attract or develop
the sought-after valuable, rare, inimitable, and organized resources. Gaining such
embedded competencies allows them to yield sustainable competitive advantages in
their struggle against other business groups.
4.2 Competitive advantage as a problem of collective action
The observation that business groups, in their guise as networks of formally
independent organizations, can collectively control resources that form the basis for
resource-based competition with other groups has some descriptive merit (cf.
Granovetter 2005). But one important caveat applies, notably: that the private
interests of individual group members can threaten the group’s ability to create
group-level competitive advantages. More specifically, attaining group-level com-
petitive advantages in the presence of private incentives to ‘shirk’ or ‘defect’ on
collective commitments is hampered by so-called problems of collective action
(Olsen 1971). When maximum group-level performance requires sacrifices by every
individual member, and when at least some members refrain from making these
sacrifices in the hope that others will compensate for them, the group as a whole
suffers. Concrete examples of collective action problems in the context of developing
embedded competencies have been provided by various authors (Hamel 1991). Each
of these examples shows that in the absence of appropriate relational governance
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mechanisms, even minor dissociations between the private and collective benefits of
collaboration lead to suboptimal outcomes for the group as a whole.
Collectively, a group of organizations benefits most from a completely
unrestricted free flow of competencies throughout the entire business group.
Without internal barriers to replication (Winter and Szulanski 2001), all organiza-
tions in a group are able to access and adopt the best possible competencies,
regardless of where they are located in the business group. The problem, of course,
is that business groups are comprised of formally independent organizations that
also worry about their private benefits. For each firm individually, the greatest
benefits obtain when the other members of the group freely share their competencies
with all their counterparts, while the focal organization retains the exclusive right to
exploit the specific subset of its own set of resources that is already ‘‘best in class’’
(Hamel 1991).
Attaining group-level competitive advantages is thus a typical problem of
collective action, in that it involves a potential clash of collective and private
interests that must be neutralized with the help of relational governance mechanisms
for Pareto-optimal results to obtain. So how can firms in a business group secure
themselves against their fellow group members’ pursuit of strictly private benefits?
Two relational governance mechanisms are proposed here: restrictions to group
access, and profit redistribution rules.
4.3 Restricting group access
In this paper, it has been stressed repeatedly that the foundation for embedded
competencies consists of thick social ties between business group members
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; McEvily and Zaheer 1999; Uzzi 1997). It
therefore makes sense to look inside embedded relationships for a solution to the
collective action problem. Strict arms-length governance, based on pecuniary
incentive alignment and court-enforceable contracts, will rarely form a fruitful basis
for capitalizing on embedded competences. The private and collective benefits of
such competencies are only produced in business groups characterized by trust,
information sharing, and joint problem solving (McEvily and Marcus 2005). As a
matter of fact, many business groups operate according to strong principles of
solidarity, grounded in kinship, shared ethnicity, religious beliefs, or the regional
identity of the grouped businesses (Granovetter 2005). So a first partial solution to
the collective action problem consists of keeping solidarity-based business groups
tight-knit and exclusive, since unrestricted entry and exit would encourage
opportunistic acts and undermine trust.
Business groups across a variety of contexts ensure the exclusivity of their
membership, and thereby increase the shadow of the future (Axelrod 1984) for each
of the individual business group members, either by restricting or phasing entry to
the group. Most modern business groups are organized around kinship ties, core
firms, or dominant financiers (Gerlach 1992; Orru` et al. 1996). In each of these
instances a limited number of dominant actors—say, a family elder, a flagship firm,
or a central bank—can bar prospective new members from entering the business
group. But even if entry is granted, initial membership is often not full-fledged.
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Many business groups consist of several hierarchically organized ‘‘tiers,’’ which are
best conceptualized as ‘‘castes’’ or ‘‘classes’’ in that most of the status and privileges
are concentrated in the higher strata, and most of the duties and obligations reside in
the lower echelons (Biggart and Guille´n 1999; Boisot and Child 1996). Business
group entry is typically phased in that new members enter into one of the lower
tiers, and can only make it to the higher hierarchical levels after repeated
demonstrations of their loyalty and trustworthiness. The preservation of exclusivity
via restricted entry thus provides a fertile context for the continued, more or less
frictionless exploitation of embedded competencies in the higher tiers of the
business group’s hierarchy.
4.4 Profit redistribution rules
Keeping business groups exclusive is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
overcoming the problem of collectively producing competitive advantage. Exclu-
sivity in business groups puts a ‘‘face’’ on all potential collaborators, and stimulates
as well as cements the development of deeply embedded ties. At the same time,
resolving the collective action problem requires more than just the screening and
socialization of individual members. Specifically, what is needed is a sustainable
and mutually attractive balance between individual and collective benefits (Nault
and Tyagi 2001), such that members are rewarded for opening up their
competencies to other group members and sanctioned when they decide to
exclusively pursue their own success. The simplest and most commonly applied
approach for ‘institutionalizing solidarity’ is developing a set of so-called profit
redistribution rules. Such rules have been used at the interpersonal level to provide
coalitions with staying-power (Simpson and Macy 2001); at the interfirm level to
produce solidarity amongst alliance partners (Gedajlovic and Shapiro 2002); and at
the state level to keep inefficient firms afloat (Brada et al. 1997).
Prior research on business groups has shown that profit redistribution, whereby
stronger firms assist weaker firms by allocating part of their profits to them, is in
fact an endemic property of such collectives (Gedajlovic and Shapiro 2002;
Khanna and Rivkin 2001). It is tempting to see such profit redistribution practices
as a rational insurance scheme, in which profitable firms pay a ‘premium’ by
bailing out firms with weaker performance, such that they can expect help in
return in case they experience a temporary slump in profits (cf. Granovetter 2005).
Yet the various types of loyalty, solidarity, and obligation that cement the ties in
business groups are often hard to reconcile with such a notion grounded in
individual rationality. Research by Lincoln and Gerlach (2004) shows that profit
redistribution is better interpreted as an instrument that promotes solidarity
amongst members and that allows for functional specialization across indepen-
dently owned firms. Profit redistribution rules play an important role in our
analysis of the competitive advantage of business groups, because they provide a
rationale for the shared membership of embedded competencies. After all, who
‘owns’ such competencies in the strict, exclusive sense of the term is largely
irrelevant if the profits stemming from them are up for redistribution amongst all
members comprising the group.
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Three common profit redistribution rules are available for stimulating the
collective use of embedded competencies. The first may be called the fee rule (Nault
and Tyagi 2001), which rewards an individual member for making its competencies
available by prescribing a fee, to be paid by the user, each time its competencies are
accessed and used by another business group member. The second may be called the
royalty rule (Nault and Tyagi 2001), which rewards competency-sharing by allowing
the original controller of a given competency a share of the user’s profits through the
installment of a royalty on the latter’s sales. The third, and to the Western observer
most puzzling rule, may be called the nested hierarchy rule (Chang 1999). The rule
states that firms higher up in the structural hierarchy of the group must invest their
excess profits in firms lower down in the hierarchy, especially when these firms are
troubled or are experiencing difficulties in financing their own investment projects.
The crucial point is that these investments in lower-positioned firms are triggered by
social obligations rather than purely economic motivations.
Again, these economic governance rules are not in and of themselves sufficient
for resolving the problem of collectively attaining competitive advantage, because
each rule is in and of itself vulnerable to metering and tampering. But in
combination with preexisting embedded ties these rules stimulate the joint
attainment of competitive advantage by putting a positive economic incentive on
competency sharing in a social environment characterized by trust, information
sharing, and joint problem solving.
5 Conclusion
The present paper challenges the orthodox view in strategic management that
competencies should be uniquely linked to the individual firm in case they are to
serve as a basis for competitive advantage. As we have argued, this discrete
perspective is less relevant in the contemporary business landscape, in which more
and more economically productive activities are organized through the ‘‘privately
owned social structures’’ (Chang 1999) of business groups. To come to terms with
these developments, we proposed a reconceptualized version of the RBV that aims
to explain competitive advantage at the group-versus-group level of analysis rather
than at the more traditional firm-versus-firm level.
Two complementary ambitions guided us in writing this paper. A first ambition
was to offer a reconceptualization of the traditional discrete competency perspec-
tive. At the heart of our new definition lies the conviction that competencies are not
a form of organizational capital, but rather a form of social capital—a property of
the structure and content of business groups rather than of the strategic architecture
of individual firms. A second ambition was to demonstrate how embedded
competencies might lead to competitive advantage, given that the aforementioned
reconceptualization violates the foundational premise of the discrete RBV. As we
have argued, the traditional RBV is still useful for explaining competitive advantage
in a group-versus-group situation, albeit with one important caveat. A problem of
collective action must be overcome at this level, in the sense that individual group
members must receive a proper set of incentives to induce them to freely share their
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competencies with other parties in their business group. This problem of collective
action can only be put to rest when sensible profit redistribution rules cemented with
embedded social ties provide a sustainable balance between the private and
collective benefits to be appropriated by all members of the business group.
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